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STAYING TRUE TO NSMIA: 
A ROADMAP FOR SUCCESSFUL STATE 
FIDUCIARY RULES AFTER REG BI 
MARIA E. VAZ FERREIRA† 
INTRODUCTION 
As Americans, there is hardly anything we value more than 
freedom.  Being “free to choose” is the core guarantee through which 
we pursue our livelihood and succeed at happiness.  The more 
choices, the better.  But what if we we are supposed to choose 
blindly?  In our postindustrial society, we often feel overwhelmed 
by the myriad choices we must make simply to get through our 
daily lives.  To inform our choices, we rely on assumptions.  More 
importantly, we rely on each other. 
Reliance is central in the world of financial investments.  Finan-
cial products are increasingly complex, and investors need special-
ized information to choose suitable investments.  In our current 
economy, more than half of all families own stocks either directly 
or indirectly as part of a fund, and many resort to the services of a 
financial services professional.1  Americans place their hopes for 
economic progress and stability on financial advisers, who can be 
broker dealers (“BDs”), investment advisers (“IAs”), money man-
agers, investment consultants, financial planners, general part-
ners of hedge funds, and many others who get paid for giving 
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1 Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evi-
dence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RSRV. BULL., Sept. 2017, at 1, 20, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/scf17.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FVF-
AUHM]. 
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personalized securities advice.2  However, investors largely ignore 
that most of these professionals are not required to disclose all 
conflicts of interest, or to put their own interests aside when 
making recommendations.3  Only registered investment advisers 
must adhere to this fiduciary standard, and the consequences to 
investors can be devastating.4  
Traditionally, the role of BDs was limited to executing secu-
rities transactions for a transaction fee, and IAs provided ongoing 
account management and investment advice for a fixed percentage 
of managed assets.5  Today, however, the differences between 
traditional BDs and IAs are not so clear-cut.6  BDs now offer a wide 
spectrum of services and products, including investment advice 
and recommendations, both to institutional and retail investors.7  
Some BDs are also registered as IAs, which allows their represen-
tatives to act as IAs for some of a client’s accounts and as BDs for 
that client’s other accounts.8  Investors often do not distinguish 
between BDs and IAs, but they do expect to receive honest, 
unconflicted advice from financial professionals they trust.9 
However, BD compensation and incentive structures may 
prompt their representatives to recommend the investments that 
will pay the broker the most.10  Thus, BDs often recommend high-
fee, high-yield investments, but fail to inform their clients of how 
 
2 Investment Adviser, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-
investing/investing-basics/glossary/investment-adviser [https://perma.cc/S4MH-9UYJ] 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2021).  
3 Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n (“PIABA”), Comment Letter on Draft Fiduciary Duty 
Regulations 2–3 (Mar. 1, 2019), https://piaba.org/system/files/2019-03/Comment 
%20Letter%20%28March%201%202019%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SDM-FCJN]; see 
also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER‐
DEALERS 101 (2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/CKV8-XXP5]. 
4 Christine Lazaro, The Future of Financial Advice: Eliminating the False 
Distinction Between Brokers and Investment Advisers, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 381, 382 
(2013); Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. IA-5248, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,669, 36,671 (July 12, 2019). 
5 Lazaro, supra note 4, at 398. 
6 Id. at 382. 
7 Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should 
Be Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 711 (2012); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra 
note 3, at 8. 
8 Lazaro, supra note 4, at 412. 
9 Andrew Osterland, Is Your Advisor a Fiduciary? Chances Are, You Have No 
Idea, CNBC: ADVICE & THE ADVISOR (Jun. 17, 2015, 9:08 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2015/06/16/is-your-advisor-a-fiduciary-chances-are-you-have-no-idea.html [https:// 
perma.cc/K69F-SSPZ]. 
10 Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-86031, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,318, 33,426 (July 12, 2019). 
2020] STAYING TRUE TO NSMIA 559 
risky and illiquid these products are.11  Focusing on their own in-
terests, BDs can cause investors to suffer losses from which they 
may not recover, by investing in high‐risk products, accelerating 
their retirement, or withdrawing their defined benefit pension as 
a lump sum.12 
Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
approved Regulation Best Interest (“Reg BI”), a package of rule-
makings and interpretations designed to protect retail investors 
while preserving their ability to choose the services and compen-
sation structure that better serve their needs.13  Regulation BI 
sought to set a clearer standard of BD conduct.  However, the new 
standard falls short of what many investor advocates, and even 
the SEC, had previously deemed necessary.14  Some state legisla-
tors have responded by proposing rules that bring the fiduciary 
duties of those BDs who provide investment advice in line with the 
duties of care and loyalty imposed on IAs by the common law.15  
Industry actors oppose these state efforts and argue that the Na-
tional Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”)16 
preempts state efforts in this field.17  This Note argues that 
NSMIA does not necessarily preempt state regulations imposing 
fiduciary duties on BDs.  While it is true that NSMIA sets bounda-
 
11 Christine Lazaro, President, PIABA, Statement Before the New Jersey Bureau 
of Securities (Nov. 19, 2018), https://piaba.org/system/files/2018-11/Statement%20of 
%20Christine%20Lazaro%20NJ%20Bureau%20of%20Securities%20Nov%2019%20 
2018_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3HQ-4794].  
12 PIABA, supra note 3, at 7.  
13 See generally Regulation Best Interest, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15l–1 (2020).  
14 See, e.g., James Lundy & Robert Mancuso, Seven States and D.C. Aggressively 
Challenge Reg BI, JD SUPRA (Sept. 11 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ 
seven-states-and-d-c-aggressively-76074/ [https://perma.cc/N3BS-BT3M]; U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 3, at 101.  
15 See, e.g., Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, Investment Advisers, and Agents, 
51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (proposed April 15, 2019) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 13:47A-6.3, 4); Amendments to the Standard of Conduct Applicable to Broker-
Dealers and Agents (notice of adoption Feb. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 950 MASS. 
CODE REGS. 12.200) [hereinafter Mass. Adopting Release], https://www.sec.state.ma 
.us/sct/sctfiduciaryconductstandard/Adopting-Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM7V-
37W9]; Notice of Draft Regulations and Request for Comment (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=6156 [https://perma.cc/37ZL-QKY9]. 
16 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 
110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
17 Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n (“SIFMA”), Comment Letter on Regulation Best 
Interest (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-18/s70718-5263945-
183727.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQJ6-3YZG]. 
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ries to state regulatory authority over BD conduct, it also provides 
a roadmap for the states to successfully avoid preemption.18 
This Note is divided into five parts.  Part I describes the his-
torical landscape of securities laws and regulations.  Part II ad-
dresses NSMIA’s purpose, and the allocation of duties between the 
states and the federal government.  Part III analyzes whether 
NSMIA preempts state fiduciary rules governing BDs who give 
investment advice.  Part IV argues that state fiduciary rules can 
avoid preemption by successfully balancing the competing pur-
poses of NSMIA, avoiding vague language, and imposing a scope 
of duties that is consistent with common law precedent.  Part V 
offers policy arguments supporting state regulation of BD conduct 
affecting retail consumers. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. History of Securities Regulation 
Today, the professionals who carry out securities transactions 
and provide financial advice to investors must comply with several 
layers of regulation: federal laws, state laws, federal rules such as 
those adopted by the SEC, state rules, and rules of self-regulatory 
organizations such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Author-
ity (“FINRA”).19 
This multilayered system of regulation first emerged when 
the federal government entered the field of securities regulation, 
which, up until that point, the states had been regulating for 
almost two decades.20  In 1917, the Supreme Court of the United 
States decided the Blue Sky Cases and held that state “blue-sky 
laws . . . did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment” and did not 
“unduly burden interstate commerce.”21  With the onset of the 
Great Depression, Congress saw the need to intervene and enacted 
the first federal securities laws.22  Congress first centered its regu-
latory efforts on issuers and enacted the Securities Act of 1933 
(“1933 Act”).23  Next, it focused on brokers.  With the Securities 
 
18 Can State Laws One-Up SEC’s Regulation Best Interest?, LAW360 (Nov. 13, 
2019, 4:34 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1219205 (subscription required). 
19 Lazaro, supra note 4, at 381. 
20 Evan J. Leitch, The Antifraud Savings Clause of the National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act of 1996, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1769, 1771–72 (2009). 
21 Id. at 1772–73. 
22 Lazaro, supra note 4, at 381. 
23 Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). 
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Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”),24 Congress created the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).25  By then, forty-seven of 
the then existing forty-eight states had adopted their own blue-sky 
statutes.26  According to the SEC, the broad purposes of national 
securities laws “can be reduced to two common-sense notions”: 
(1) “[c]ompanies offering securities for sale to the public must tell 
the truth about their business, the securities they are selling, and 
the risks involved in investing in those securities”; and (2) “[t]hose 
who sell and trade securities—brokers, dealers, and exchanges—
must treat investors fairly and honestly.”27  Soon after, Congress 
passed the Maloney Act of 1938,28 which amended the Exchange 
Act to entrust a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) with making 
the rules necessary to discipline member misconduct and ensure 
market integrity and investor protection.29  That SRO is now 
known as FINRA.30  When Congress enacted the Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940 (“1940 Act”),31 BDs were already regulated by 
both the SEC and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(“NASD”), FINRA’s predecessor.32  The 1940 Act provides a com-
prehensive framework for regulating federally registered IAs and 
expressly excludes BDs.33  These are some of the historical reasons 
why the conduct of BDs and IAs is governed by separate regulatory 
schemes.34  
 
24 Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
25 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2018). 
26 Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing 
Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229, 229 (2003).  
27 The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-
investing/investing-basics/role-sec [https://perma.cc/23DU-PKUR] (last visited Jan. 2, 
2021). 
28 Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.). 
29 The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry: Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/role-
sec/laws-govern-securities-industry#invadvact1940 [https://perma.cc/8BW3-T4U4] (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2021). 
30 Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment 
Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 402 (2010). 
31 Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.). 
32 Laby, supra note 30, at 402. 
33 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2, 80b-6 (2018). 
34 See infra Section I.B.  
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Congress did not intend that federal laws occupy the entire 
field of securities regulation.35  However, the financial services in-
dustry grew rapidly, and its participants brought the issue of inef-
ficent, overlapping regulations to Congress’ attention.36  NSMIA 
was enacted to address the inefficiencies of duplicative federal and 
state regulations, and to promote “efficiency, competition and 
capital formation” in addition to investor protection.37   
After NSMIA, the federal government enacted several addi-
tional statutes governing the securities industry.  In 1998, Con-
gress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
(“SLUSA”),38 which preempted private securities class actions 
against nationally traded securities.39  In 2002, Congress enacted 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOA”),40 which sought to foster corporate 
responsibility in financial disclosures and to combat corporate 
fraud, especially in accounting.  Another major securities upheav-
al took place on July 21, 2010, with the passage of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”).41  Dodd-Frank’s explicit goal was to “promote the finan-
cial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system, . . . to protect the American 
taxpayer . . . , [and] to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices.”42  Particularly, Dodd-Frank authorized the SEC 
to (1) conduct a study on the effectiveness of the existing standards 
of care for BDs and IAs and (2) promulgate rules to harmonize 
these standards.43  The SEC exercised this authority when it 
adopted Reg BI.44 
 
35 Christopher H. Pierce-Wright, State Equity Crowdfunding and Investor 
Protection, 91 WASH. L. REV. 847, 866 (2016); Leitch, supra note 20, at 1773–74. 
36 Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous. & Urb. Affs., 104th Cong. 30–31 (1996) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, 
Chairman, U.S. Securities Exchange Commission). 
37 15 U.S.C § 77b(b). 
38 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
39 Id. at 3228. 
40 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2018) 
and in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
41 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1824–30. 
44 Regulation Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-86031, 84 Fed. Reg. 
33,318, 33,329–30 (July 12, 2019). 
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B. Dual System of Laws Governing Conduct of BDs and IAs 
1. Federal Regulation of BD and IA Conduct 
On a federal level, two separate regulatory regimes govern 
BDs and IAs: (1) the 1940 Act governs IA conduct; and (2) the 1934 
Act governs BD conduct.45  Congress charged the SEC with im-
plementing the regulatory framework governing both BDs and 
IAs, and the SEC delegated regulatory authority over BDs to 
FINRA, which it supervises.46 
The separate frameworks governing BDs and IAs led to the 
evolution of distinct fiduciary standards.47  IAs are subject to broad 
fiduciary standards per the antifraud provisions of the 1940 Act,48 
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc.49  In Capital Gains, the Court held that 
Congress recognized IAs as fiduciaries, subject to an “affirmative 
duty of ‘utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of material 
facts,’ ” and a duty “ ‘to employ reasonable care to avoid mislead-
ing’ [their] clients.”50  The Court also found that Congress intended 
to codify fraud broadly—as developed by the courts in the common 
law51—and that an IA’s failure to disclose material facts, even 
without intent to deceive, was enforceable as fraud under the 1940 
Act.52  The SEC subsequently defined the scope of IA fiduciary 
duties, which currently includes: (1) acting in “the best interest of 
the client”; (2) “seek[ing] best execution”; (3) providing ongoing 
“advice and monitoring”; (4) fully disclosing material facts about 
prospective investments; (5) learning about the client’s goals and 
needs; (6) never “subordinat[ing] its clients’ interests to its own”; 
(7) fully “disclos[ing] all conflicts of interest” when giving advice; 
and (8) describing all fees related to an investment.53 
BDs, on the other hand, are not fiduciaries under federal law.  
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court held that the 
1934 Act does not confer a fiduciary duty on BDs because unlike 
the 1940 Act, the antifraud section of the 1934 Act requires scien-
 
45 Lazaro, supra note 4, at 390, 392. 
46 Id. at 381–82. 
47 Id. at 394. 
48 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2018). 
49 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
50 Id. at 194. 
51 Id. at 195. 
52 Id. at 194–95. 
53 See Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. IA-5248, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,669, 36,672–78 (July 12, 2019). 
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ter.54  Instead, BDs were traditionally subject to the “suitability” 
standard as defined and enforced by FINRA, now replaced by the 
Reg BI standard adopted by the SEC.55 
Reg BI requires brokers to act in the “best interest” of the 
customer when recommending securities transactions or invest-
ment strategies to retail customers.56  Reg BI limits BDs’ duties of 
care and loyalty to the duration of the particular transactions they 
are executing, and although the “best interest” standard adopted 
in Reg BI is higher than the “suitability” standard, it does not 
match the “best interest” duty applicable to fiduciaries under the 
common law.57  Instead, the SEC lists a series of requirements that 
BDs can meet to satisfy the Reg BI “best interest” standard, which 
closely resembles the preexisting suitability standard required by 
FINRA.58  To protect investors, Reg BI mandates that BDs always 
place their clients’ interests ahead of their own.59  Reg BI relies 
heavily on disclosures, which require that BDs and IAs furnish 
their clients with a disclosure form called “Form CRS Relationship 
Summary.”60  However, Reg BI does not require complete disclo-
sure or elimination of all conflicts.61  Simply put, it leaves the onus 
 
54 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976). 
55 FINRA, RULE 2111(a) (2020). The rule outlines the three main suitability ob-
ligations: reasonable-basis, customer-specific, and quantitative suitability. It requires 
that a BD or BD representative “have a reasonable basis to believe that a recom-
mended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or securities is 
suitable for the customer, based on the information obtained through the reasonable 
diligence of the [BD or BD representative] or associated person to ascertain the 
customer’s investment profile.” Id. A customer’s investment profile would include 
factors such as “age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, 
investment objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity 
needs and risk tolerance.” FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability) FAQ, FINRA, https:// 
www.finra.org/rules-guidance/key-topics/suitability/faq [https://perma.cc/3TS9-V97L] 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2021). The rule includes an exemption for institutional customers. 
Id. 
56 Regulation Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-86031, 84 Fed. Reg. 
33,318, 33,321 (July 12, 2019). 
57 Jessica Kinslow, Regulation Best Interest: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 
ADVOCATE, Oct. 2019, at 22, 22. 
58 Jacob Crawley, State-Specific Fiduciary Duties and Regulating Financial Ad-
vice in the Future, 25 PIABA B.J. 411, 431–32 (2018); see also PIABA, Comment Letter 
on Proposed Fiduciary Conduct Standard for Broker-Dealers, Agents, Investment Ad-
visers, and Investment Adviser Representatives (July 26, 2019), https://piaba.org/ 
piaba-newsroom/comment-letter-proposed-amendments-massachusetts-950-cmr-
sections-requiring-broker [https://perma.cc/3J8A-KMWE]. 
59 17 C.F.R. § 240.15l–1(a)(1) (2020). 
60 Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-86032, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-5247, 84 Fed. Reg. 
33,492, 33,493 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 240, 248, 275, 279). 
61 Regulation Best Interest, 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,388–89. 
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on the investor to read the fine print, and directs companies to 
make the fine print bigger.  Reg BI also gives wide latitude to BDs 
providing securities advice.  The 1940 Act establishes that BDs 
who give advice that is “solely incidental” to a securities trans-
action are not subject to the duties imposed on IAs, and Reg BI 
defines “solely incidental” as any advice given “in connection with 
and . . . reasonably related to the broker-dealer’s primary business 
of effecting securities transactions.”62 
BDs must also satisfy the extensive recordkeeping and 
monitoring requirements under Section 17(a) of the 1934 Act,63 
and its corresponding SEC regulations under Rule 17a.64  Addi-
tionally, FINRA can enforce Rule 17a and impose its own record-
keeping requirements.  FINRA’s recordkeeping rules include: 
(1) Rule 2210,65 requiring BDs to retain records of all communica-
tions with retail customers; (2) Rule 4511,66 mandating compliance 
with federal and FINRA books and records requirements; (3) Rule 
4530,67 imposing a duty to report certain disciplinary and legal 
matters; and (4) Rule 3110,68 establishing supervision require-
ments.  Rule 3110 requires BDs to implement a written super-
visory system to ensure that everyone associated with the firm 
complies with all regulations applicable to BDs, and the rule 
requires that BDs retain books and records documenting com-
pliance with the firm’s inspection and supervision duties.69  
Therefore, any additional rule imposed on a BD, regardless of 
whether the rule requires recordkeeping per se, would indirectly 
create a duty to keep records of compliance through FINRA Rule 
3110.  
In sum, the key differences between the scope of the fiduciary 
duties applicable to BDs and those applicable to IAs are: (1) that 
while IAs have an ongoing duty of care and monitoring, the duty 
of care imposed on BDs ends when the transaction ends; and 
(2) that the standard of required disclosures under the duty of 
 
62 Commission Interpretation Regarding the Solely Incidental Prong of the 
Broker-Dealer Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Adviser, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. IA-5249, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,681, 33,685 (July 12, 2019) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276). 
63 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2018). 
64 17 C.F.R § 240.17a–1 (2020). 
65 FINRA, RULE 2210 (2019). 
66 FINRA, RULE 4511 (2011). 
67 FINRA, RULE 4530 (2020). 
68 FINRA, RULE 3110(b)(1), (7) (2020). 
69 Id. 
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loyalty is higher for IAs.  The actual effect of disclosures and 
investor protections afforded by Reg BI will be further defined by 
FINRA, the states, and the courts through future implementation. 
2. Regulation of BD and IA Conduct at the State Level 
States typically have strong antifraud rules mirroring federal 
standards, and their role in policing fraud has not diminished 
since the passage of NSMIA.70  States interpret their antifraud 
statutes broadly,71 and some state statutes do not require scienter 
in civil securities-fraud enforcement actions.72  Although federal 
antifraud provisions do not recognize a private right of action for IA 
misconduct, their state counterparts often do.73  Prior to NSMIA, 
most states already had rules targeting dishonest and unethical 
conduct of BDs and IAs74—some modeled after the Dishonest or 
Unethical Business Practices Model Rules promulgated in 1983 by 
the North American Securities Administrators Association 
(“NASAA”).75  Some states have defined BD unethical conduct very 
broadly, giving state enforcement agencies great latitude to find 
violations, even if the conduct found to transgress the state statute 
is permitted under federal statutes.76  
Overall, states have construed federal standards as a 
baseline, and have enhanced regulation of BD and IA conduct to 
address new fraudulent and unethical schemes affecting their 
 
70 Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Role of Blue Sky Laws After NSMIA and the 
Jobs Act, 66 DUKE L.J. 605, 618–19 (2016). 
71 See, e.g., People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 38–39 (N.Y. 1926) 
(holding that the word “fraud” under New York’s antifraud statute, the Martin Act, 
should “be given a wide meaning” and include all deceitful or misleading acts that 
come within the purpose of the law, regardless of intent to harm or defraud); People 
v. Simon, 886 P.2d 1271, 1286 (Cal. 1995) (authorizing enforcement actions under 
California’s antifraud statute even where an “offeror was unaware that his or her 
sales pitch was misleading”); People ex rel. Cuomo v. Greenberg, 95 A.D.3d 474, 482–
83 (1st Dep’t 2012), aff’d, 21 N.Y.3d 439 (N.Y. 2013). 
72 See Foster v. Alex, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
73 See AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., SURVEY OF STATE INVESTMENT ADVISER LAWS 31 
(1999), https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/d15130_invest.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
9PJA-WEMY]. 
74 Id. at 26–27. See also CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 36b-31-15b (2020); IOWA ADMIN. 
CODE r. 191-50.16(502) (2020); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 15, § 30-51.170 (2020). 
75 Compare 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.204 (2020), with MODEL RULE, DISHONEST 
OR UNETHICAL BUSINESS PRACTICES OF BROKER-DEALERS AND AGENTS (N. AM. SEC. 
ADM’RS ASS’N 1983), http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/29-Dishonest 
_Practices_of_BD_or_Agent.83.pdf [https://perma.cc/42B9-54QB].  
76 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25216 (West 2020) (“The commissioner shall, for 
the purposes of this subdivision, by rule define such schemes, devices or contrivances 
as are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent.”). 
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citizens.  State statutes of this kind have not been preempted, and 
investors have continued to rely on states’ statutory causes of 
action for relief.77  
3. BD Fiduciary Duties Under the Common Law 
State efforts to impose statutory fiduciary duties on BDs are 
new, but these duties have been long recognized under the 
common law.  The scope of BD fiduciary duties under the common 
law depends on the nature of the agency relationship.78  In Leib v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the court recognized 
three different scenarios: (1) where the BD has discretion over a 
client’s account; (2) where the account is nondiscretionary, and the 
client makes the trading decisions; and (3) where the BD has de 
facto control over a nondiscretionary account.79  When a BD is han-
dling a discretionary account, he becomes a full-fledged fiduciary, 
owing a duty of loyalty, due care, and utmost good faith.80  If the 
customer has a nondiscretionary account with the broker, the BD 
has a limited duty “to serve his customer’s financial interest 
within the framework of a single transaction only.”81  The third 
scenario is the special circumstances scenario.  In this scenario, 
the court will look at the client’s sophistication, the degree of trust 
and confidence in the relationship, and other special circum-
stances to determine whether the client was sufficiently informed 
and involved in his account so as to have “retained control.”82  The 
courts will analyze the facts and circumstances of each case, and 
a BD’s broad advice regarding investment decisions and strate-
gies, upon which the customer has frequently relied, can be a 
strong indication that the account is discretionary.83 
However, some state courts have gone even further, holding 
BDs of nondiscretionary trading accounts to broad fiduciary 
duties.  In Holmes v. Grubman,84 the Georgia Supreme Court 
 
77 Yokell v. Draper, No. 18-CV-02124, 2018 WL 3417514, at *2, *8–9 (N.D. Cal. 
July 13, 2018). 
78 Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Ad-
visers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 723 (2010). 
79 461 F. Supp. 951, 952–54 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981). 
80 Id. at 953. 
81 Id. at 952.  
82 Id. at 954–55.  
83 Ron A. Rhoades, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Defining the Term “Fidu-
ciary” 41 & n. 97 (Apr. 12, 2011), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-
regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB32/posthearing00030.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/82Q4-NHUX]. 
84 691 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. 2010). 
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stated that “[a] stock broker’s duty to account to its customer is 
fiduciary in nature, so that the broker is obligated to exercise the 
utmost good faith.”85  California courts have also found that BDs 
are fiduciaries of their clients and that BDs have “the duty to act 
in the highest good faith toward the customer.”86  The California 
Court of Appeals noted that a fiduciary duty always exists in a 
broker-customer relationship, and that the real issue is deter-
mining the scope of the fiduciary obligation, which depends on the 
facts of the case.87  
II.  NSMIA’S ROLE IN THE SECURITIES REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
A. NSMIA’s General Purpose 
NSMIA amended federal securities laws to “promote efficiency 
and capital formation in the financial markets, and . . . to promote 
more efficient management of mutual funds, protect investors, and 
provide more effective and less burdensome regulation.”88  Con-
gress did not intend to sacrifice investor protection for efficiency; 
its concern was that the existing dual system burdened the 
national industry “without providing commensurate protection to 
investors or to our markets.”89 
To achieve its dual goal, NSMIA chose to “reallocat[e] respon-
sibility over the regulation of the nation’s securities markets in a 
more logical fashion between the Federal government and the 
states.”90  First, Congress preempted state regulation in (1) “offer-
ings of securities by mutual funds”; (2) “offerings by companies 
traded on a national securities exchange”; and (3) “exempt of-
ferings under Rule 506,”91 and it also gave the SEC discretion to 
expand preemption by defining “qualified purchasers.”92  Second, 
Congress deliberately preserved the states’ ability to bring anti-
fraud enforcement actions against covered BDs and IAs operating 
 
85 Id. at 201 (quoting Minor v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 409 S.E.2d 262, 264 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1991)). 
86 Apollo Cap. Fund, LLC v. Roth Cap. Partners, LLC, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 199, 215 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Duffy v. Cavalier, 215 Cal. Rptr. 740, 752 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1989)). 
87 Id. at 215–16. 
88 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 
110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C). 
89 H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 39 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
90 Id. at 39–40. 
91 Campbell, supra note 70, at 614. 
92 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2018). 
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within their borders.93  Congress wanted states to continue “pro-
tect[ing] investors through application of state antifraud laws.”94 
B. The Arguments for and Against State Preemption in the 
Current Debate 
Investor advocates and some state regulators believe that 
NSMIA does not preempt state-specific fiduciary regulations, as 
shown by NSMIA’s savings clause95 and Congress’s acquiescence 
in the historical development of state laws in the field.96  They 
argue that state fiduciary regulations are necessary because the 
existing standards do not match investors’ expectations and do not 
effectively protect them against losses caused by BD conflicts of 
interests,97 churning in senior citizen’s brokerage accounts, sales 
of unsuitable products, and inadequate supervision of BD’s agents’ 
activities, among others.98  They argue that Reg BI and other 
federal standards should be interpreted as a “floor, not a ceiling.”99 
On the other hand, industry advocates argue that NSMIA 
preempts these regulations100 because: (1) NSMIA preempts state 
books and records requirements; and (2) BDs would inevitably 
need to maintain books and records to show compliance with the 
new fiduciary standard.101  For example, through the operation of 
 
93 See infra Section III.A. 
94 H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 40. 
95 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1); see also infra text accompanying note 123. 
96 Crawley, supra note 58, at 422–25; Comment Letter for NASAA as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting the Massachusetts Securities Division, Fidelity Brokerage Servs., LLC, at 
7, Docket No. E-2015-0078 (Mar. 30, 2017) [hereinafter NASAA Amicus Letter], https:// 
www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/NASAA-Amicus-Letter-Massachusetts-3-
30-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6LL-BHM5]. 
97 See, e.g., Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, Investment Advisers, and Agents, 
51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (proposed Apr. 15, 2019) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 13:47A-6.3, 4). 
98 Investment Products and Sales Practices Commonly Used to Defraud Seniors: 
Stories from the Front Line, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ 
seniors/elderfraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF6J-Z5RT] (last visited Jan. 2, 2021). 
99 Robert J. Jackson Jr., Statement on Final Rules Governing Investment Advice, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/statement-jackson-060519-iabd [https://perma.cc/NP2N-LM68].  
100 SIFMA, Comment Letter on Massachuesetts Securities Division’s Proposed 
Fiduciary Conduct Standard 15–17 (July 26, 2019), https://www.sifma.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/SIFMA-Comments-on-MA-Fiduciary-Proposal-July-26-2019 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4V7-A2RW]. 
101 Id.; see also SIFMA et al., Comment Letter on Massachusetts Securities Divi-
sion’s Proposed Fiduciary Conduct Standard 6 (July 26, 2019), https://www.sifma.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Joint-Trade-Association-Letter-on-MA-Fiduciary-Proposal-
July-26-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9U5-WSDD]. 
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rules such as FINRA 3110, firms would have to keep documents to 
prove whether they made “reasonable inquiries into the risks, 
costs and conflicts of interest” related to a recommendation.102  To 
weather additional legal exposure and compliance costs, some BDs 
would need to reduce the number of BD representatives operating 
in the state or pass the costs to investors, limiting access to the 
cheaper, transaction-based advice that benefits investors who 
cannot afford the services of an IA.103  Both the SEC and the 
financial services industry believe that the Reg BI package is more 
than a new suitability standard, and that it adds meaningful 
protections for investors while preserving their ability to choose 
the financial services and products that better suit their needs.104  
They also contend that the balkanized fiduciary standard would 
further confuse investors, so it would unnecessarily disrupt capital 
markets without bringing added benefits to investors, contrary to 
NSMIA’s explicit purpose.105  
The industry presented these arguments when the SEC was 
considering Reg BI,106 and urged the SEC to preempt state 
regulatory initiatives, but the SEC declined.107  It stated that 
“[w]hether Regulation Best Interest would have a preemptive 
effect on any state law would be determined in future judicial 
proceedings, and would depend on the language and operation of 
the particular state law at issue” and on whether that language is 
“the type of law, rule, or regulation that is expressly preempted by 
the securities law or impliedly preempted under principles applied 
by courts.”108  
 
102 David Libowsky & Daniel Strashun, N.J. Fiduciary Rule Would Add to Invest-
ment Firms’ Burdens, LAW360 (May 1, 2019, 3:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/1153679/nj-fiduciary-rule-would-add-to-investment-firms-burdens (subscrip-
tion required). 
103 SIFMA, supra note 100, at 1, 13. 
104 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules and Interpre-
tations To Enhance Protections and Preserve Choice for Retail Investors in Their 
Relationships with Financial Professionals (June 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press-release/2019-89 [https://perma.cc/UW2T-2ASF]; SIFMA, supra note 100, at 4–5. 
105 SIFMA, supra note 100, at 2. 
106 SIFMA, supra note 17, at 2–4. 
107 Regulation Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-86031, 84 Fed. Reg. 
33,318, 33,327, 33,435 n.1163 (July 12, 2019). 
108 Id. at 33,435 n.1163 (emphasis added).  
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III.  PREEMPTION OF STATE REGULATIONS IMPOSING 
COMMON LAW FIDUCIARY DUTIES ON BDS WHO 
PROVIDE INVESTMENT ADVICE 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 
states that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land,”109 
and it is well established that “state law that conflicts with federal 
law is ‘without effect.’ ”110  However, the analysis of issues arising 
under the Supremacy Clause “start[s] with the assumption that 
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded 
by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose 
of Congress.”111 
“Congress has the constitutional power to preempt state 
law . . . expressly—through clear statutory language—or implicit-
ly.”112  Implicit preemption can take the form of either field or 
conflict preemption.113  Courts find field preemption when they es-
tablish that it was Congress’s intention to occupy an entire field of 
regulations.114  Conflict preemption occurs in cases where federal 
law is in conflict with state law, because the contradictions that 
would result imply Congress’s intent to preempt state law.115  
Federal law is in conflict with state law if a party’s compliance 
with both federal and state requirements is impossible or if, 
considering “the federal statute’s purpose and intended effects, 
state law poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s 
objectives.”116 
In sum, congressional purpose is the “ultimate touchstone” in 
every preemption case.117  Consequently, the analysis must look at 
the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole, both through 
its text and through a “reasoned understanding of the way in 
which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regula-
tory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law.”118 
 
109 U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. 
110 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. 
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)). 
111 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218, 230 (1947)). 
112 Whistler Invs., Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 539 F.3d 1159, 1164 





117 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Malone v. White 
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)). 
118 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996). 
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A. Express Preemption 
The plain language of NSMIA’s express preemption clause is 
the starting point of any inquiry.119  Where the statute contains an 
express preemption clause, the Court does not focus on the 
presumption against preemption but on “the plain wording of the 
clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ 
pre-emptive intent.”120  
With regards to BDs, NSMIA preempts state regulations that 
impose books and records requirements in addition to those 
established by federal law.121  The BD state law exemption reads:  
No law, rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action 
of any State or political subdivision thereof shall establish 
capital, custody, margin, financial responsibility, making and 
keeping records, bonding, or financial or operational reporting 
requirements for brokers, dealers, municipal securities dealers, 
government securities brokers, or government securities dealers 
that differ from, or are in addition to, the requirements in those 
areas established under this chapter.122 
However, there is a zone of activity reserved for the states.  
NSMIA’s “savings clause” states that: 
Consistent with this section, the securities commission (or any 
agency or office performing like functions) of any State shall 
retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate and 
bring enforcement actions, in connection with securities or 
securities transactions 
(A)  with respect to— 
(i) fraud or deceit; or  
(ii) unlawful conduct by a broker, dealer, or funding 
portal . . . .123 
It is important to note that the savings clause authorizes 
enforcement actions for BD “unlawful conduct” in addition to fraud 
and deceit.124  If every word and every provision of the statute is to 
be given effect, “unlawful conduct” must mean that the state’s 
enforcement authority includes some other type of conduct beyond 
mere fraud or deceit.125   
 
119 See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016). 
120 Id. 
121 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(1) (2018). 
122 Id. (emphasis added). 
123 Id. § 77r(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
124 Id. 
125 See, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988). 
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No other provisions within NSMIA define these terms and 
their scope.126  However, the text, history, and purpose of the 
savings clause, as well as state interpretations through enforce-
ment, establish that the intent of Congress was to leave the state’s 
power to define and proscribe unlawful conduct broadly, just as 
they had before NSMIA.127 
The clause’s title is “Preservation of authority,” and it empha-
sizes that states “shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such 
State to investigate and bring enforcement actions.”128  The plain 
language of the statute shows that Congress intended to preserve 
the states’ preexisting laws with respect to BD fraudulent or 
otherwise unlawful conduct. 
Legislative history supports this broad reading of the statute.  
The House Report emphasizes that the statute did not intend to 
“alter, limit, expand, or otherwise affect in any way any State 
statutory or common law with respect to fraud or deceit, including 
broker-dealer sales practices, in connection with securities or 
securities transactions.”129  This language unambiguously extends 
to covered securities.130  Additionally, in the House Conference Re-
port, Congress noted that the “preservation of authority is in-
tended to permit state securities regulators to continue to exercise 
their police power to prevent fraud and broker-dealer sales practice 
abuses, such as churning accounts or misleading customers.”131 
Congress left the states free to apply their own antifraud 
statutes, knowing that states could modify and expand those 
statutes.132  NSMIA’s plain language left the states free to “define 
their antifraud standards as they saw fit and to enforce their own 
sets of regulatory rules.”133  This is significant because some states’ 
antifraud statutes offer broader protections than the federal 
standard.134  The savings clause preserves the state investigative 
and enforcement authority “[c]onsistent with this section,”135 
which means that state powers are preserved as long as they are 
 
126 Linda M. Stevens, Comment, The National Securities Markets Improvement 
Act (NSMIA) Savings Clause: A New Challenge to Regulatory Uniformity, 38 U. BALT. 
L. REV. 445, 454 (2009). 
127 NASAA Amicus Letter, supra note 96, at 7. 
128 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (emphasis added).  
129 H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 34 (1996).  
130 Id. at 33–34. 
131 H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 40 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). 
132 H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 33–34. 
133 Leitch, supra note 20, at 1783. 
134 See supra Section I.B.2. 
135 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (2018). 
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not expressly preempted by the statute.  Congress was aware that 
giving states the discretion to apply their own antifraud statutes 
could defeat the purposes of NSMIA, because states could try to 
circumvent federal preemption by indirectly imposing require-
ments on issuers of covered securities.136  Congress intended to 
avoid that result and required state enforcement actions to be 
“grounded in conduct other than that which states are expressly 
preempted from regulating more generally.”137  However, Congress 
also considered that in some cases a legitimate enforcement action 
under a state’s antifraud laws could be an adequate basis for in-
cidentally stepping into preempted territory.138  
Thus, NSMIA distinguishes regulation of disclosure language 
at the point of issuance—a federal issue—from BD conduct at the 
point of sale, where client interaction occurs—a federal and state 
issue.139  Under this regime, states would be expressly preempted 
from enacting regulations intended to impose additional books and 
records requirements on BDs,140 but the states’ antifraud jurisdic-
tion would still allow states to reach conduct of BD representatives 
who are violating the antifraud statutes of the states where they 
operate.141   
Recent court decisions also support the premise that states’ 
antifraud enforcement jurisdiction can be legitimate even if it 
incidentally encroaches on federal territory. In Capital Research 
& Management Co. v. Brown,142 the California Attorney General 
brought an enforcement action for BD fraud based on additional 
compensation payments made to the BDs, which were not ade-
quately disclosed in a fund’s offering documents.143  The undis-
closed compensation was the result of shelf-space agreements, 
which are permitted under federal law.144  The Court reasoned that 
the enforcement action fell within NSMIA’s express preemption 
provisions because the state was “indirectly” requiring additional 
disclosures on offering documents of covered securities—namely, 
 
136 Stevens, supra note 126, at 455–56; Leitch, supra note 20, at 1783. 
137 Stevens, supra note 126, at 467–68 (emphasis added).  
138 H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 34 (1996). 
139 Id. 
140 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(1). 
141 Stevens, supra note 126, at 467–68. 
142 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
143 Id. at 773.  
144 Id. at 773–774. Shelf space agreements are contracts where BDs give prefer-
ential treatment to certain fund companies in exchange for payment by the fund. 
Client Commission Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 34-52635, 70 Fed. Reg. 
61,700, 61,709 n.111 (Oct. 25, 2005). 
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mutual fund shares.145  However, the court found that the action 
“just as plainly” came within NSMIA’s savings clause.146  After 
considering NSMIA’s language, purpose and legislative history, 
the Brown court was persuaded that “Congress intended to 
preserve the states’ anti-fraud authority to control the conduct of 
brokers and dealers, notwithstanding that the exercise of such 
controls might prospectively influence the disclosures made by a 
covered security.”147  The court held that enforcement actions that 
(1) are “brought by a state officer” on behalf of “a securities com-
mission” (2) under state law (3) “with regard to fraud and deceit” 
(4) “in connection with covered [securities and] securities transac-
tions” are “squarely within the ambit of the savings clause.”148 
The court’s holding is relevant in several ways.  First, it allows 
state enforcement actions that indirectly affect preempted regula-
tion areas.  Second, it expressly commits enforcement actions trig-
gered by BD statements to the laws of the state.  Third, it allows 
for a broad interpretation of a state’s antifraud statute, encom-
passing conduct that was not expressly identified as unlawful by 
any “state or federal law, rule or regulation.”149  Fourth, it illus-
trates the broad scope of conduct subject to enforcement under a 
state’s antifraud provisions.  The court reasoned that the legality 
of these shelf-space agreements was not in question, but that the 
adviser’s and distributor’s intentional failure to disclose them had 
the effect of hampering the client’s understanding of the state-
ments contained in the fund’s disclosure documents.150  Therefore, 
the misconduct was enforceable under the state’s statutes as an 
inducement to buy the fund’s shares “by means of manipulative, 
deceptive, and otherwise fraudulent contrivances.”151  Last, the 
court held that the Attorney General’s action challenging the 
conduct of a covered broker dealer “cannot be reasonably con-
strued as an effort to regulate a non-party issuer,” suggesting that 
the intention of the state regulator may be relevant to the express 
preemption analysis.152  The court in Brown concluded by holding 
that “[t]he savings clause is sufficiently broad to permit this 
 
145 Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 775. 
146 Id. at 775–76. 
147 Id. at 776. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 772–73. 
150 Id. at 776. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 777. 
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action, and as applied to this case is entirely consistent with the 
purpose of NSMIA.”153 
Brown was one of many actions brought by the California 
Attorney General immediately following the passage of a Califor-
nia law giving him “unusually broad latitude to prosecute corpo-
rate conduct,” including “inadequate disclosure of shelf-space 
agreements.”154  In People v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,155 where the 
plaintiff sued a national brokerage firm for failing to adequately 
disclose shelf-space agreements incentivizing the firm to recom-
mend certain mutual funds, the court held that neither NSMIA 
nor the applicable federal rule preempted the state from enforcing 
their broadly defined antifraud statutes.156  In Papic v. Burke,157 
the court cited Brown and stated that “[t]he State’s authority to 
enforce its laws under [the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act], 
in connection with fraud and/or with material omissions which 
would mislead investors in connection with the offer, sale, or 
purchase of securities, remains intact.”158 
To conclude, even though the language of NSMIA does not ex-
pressly address whether the states have jurisdiction to impose 
fiduciary duties on covered BDs, courts have consistently em-
braced the argument that NSMIA did not “interfere with states’ 
ability to protect their citizens from fraud, or to implement greater 
protections from fraudulent activities than the federal law 
provides.”159 
B. Implied Preemption 
Courts give special value to Congress’s express statements of 
preemption, but the inquiry does not end there: If “the question is 
whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of 
the statute must be considered, and that which . . . must be implied 
is of no less force than that which is expressed.”160  Hence, the in-
 
153 Id. at 776 (citations omitted).  
154 Stevens, supra note 126, at 457. 
155 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
156 Id. at 140–41.  
157 No. HHBCV054008511S, 2007 WL 1019000 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 2007), 
aff’d, 965 A.2d 633 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009). 
158 Id. at *5.  
159 Chamberlin v. Advanced Equities, Inc., No. C01-502R, 2002 WL 34419450, at 
*3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2002); see also IDS Bond Fund, Inc. v. Gleacher NatWest Inc., 
No. CIV. 99-116, 2002 WL 373455, at *7 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2002); Houston v. Seward 
& Kissel, LLP, No. 07CV6305, 2008 WL 818745, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008). 
160 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (quoting 
Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)). 
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quiry must move to implied preemption, which can occur through 
either field preemption or conflict preemption.  
1. Field Preemption 
Courts have found field preemption “when Congress ‘so thor-
oughly occupies a legislative field,’ that it effectively leaves ‘no 
room’ for states to regulate conduct in that field.”161  Conversely, 
there is no field preemption where Congress has shown “aware-
ness of the operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and 
has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and to tolerate 
whatever tension there [is] between them.”162 
NSMIA was Congress’s first of many opportunities to preempt 
state regulation of covered BD conduct, and it expressly declined 
to do so.  NSMIA’s allocation of jurisdiction between federal and 
state government was the product of intense cross-lobbying by the 
states and the industry, and Congress made a conscious effort 
through the years to preserve this balance.163  After NSMIA, states 
continued to enforce their misconduct statutes against covered 
BDs, and Congress acquiesced.164  Congress had the opportunity to 
speak in SLUSA and Sarbanes-Oxley as well as in Dodd-Frank, 
where it squarely addressed the issue of BD-provided investment 
advice.165  However, it repeatedly chose to affirm the states’ au-
thority to enforce their own antifraud statutes and common law 
precedent.166  
In Zuri-Invest AG v. NatWest Finance Inc.,167 the court held that 
NSMIA did not preempt state common law claims.168  The court 
reasoned that although NSMIA’s savings clause does not expressly 
address the question, Congress unequivocally expressed that 
 
161 Whistler Invs., Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 539 F.3d 1159, 1164 
(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)). 
162 CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 18 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009)). 
163 Campbell, supra note 70, at 614. 
164 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163 (2008) 
(“[W]hile the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent 
of the enacting one, such views are entitled to significant weight, and particularly so 
when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980))). 
165 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828–30 (2010). 
166 People v. Greenberg, No. 401720/05, 2010 WL 4732745, at *14–15 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 21, 2010). 
167 177 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
168 Id. at 191.  
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NSMIA does not in any way affect the state’s common law with 
respect to fraud and deceit in securities.169  It also observed that 
NSMIA did not amend the saving provisions of either the 1933 Act 
or the 1934 Act, which affirm that the rights and remedies af-
forded by the federal law shall be “in addition to any and all other 
rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity.”170  Courts 
have relied on Zuri to hold that NSMIA allows both state com-
missioners and private parties to bring state common law claims 
against BDs for conduct beyond fraud, including breach of 
fiduciary duties.171  Recognizing the states’ authority to bring com-
mon law claims against covered BDs while preempting states’ 
efforts to codify those claims in their statutes would be absurd. 
2. Conflict Preemption  
Conflict preemption occurs where a court, considering the fed-
eral statute as a whole, determines that (1) it is not possible for 
parties to comply with both federal and state requirements, or that 
(2) in view of the federal statute’s purpose and intended effects, 
the state law “poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s 
objectives.”172  Although BD compliance with state-heightened stan-
dards ensures that the federal standards are accomplished, oner-
ous compliance costs could conflict with NSMIA’s purpose of 
promoting efficient capital markets.173 
States cannot enforce their antifraud and unethical conduct 
statutes in a manner that is designed to circumvent the limita-
tions imposed by NSMIA, or in a manner that excessively burdens 
BD operations.174  Even when the states decide to regulate solely 
on antifraud policing grounds, their regulations may create 
unintended “books and records” requirements, as BDs need to 
document compliance and create systems to supervise the conduct 
of their representatives.175 
 
169 Id. at 193–94 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 33–34 (1996)).  
170 Id. at 194 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(a), 78bb(a)(2) (2018)). 
171 See, e.g., In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., No. 
09-2009, 2014 WL 12808159, at *5–6 (W.D. Tenn. July 29, 2014); Scognamillo v. 
Credit Suisse First Bos. LLC, No. C03-2061, 2005 WL 8162733, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
1, 2005). 
172 Whistler Invs., Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 539 F.3d 1159, 1164 
(9th Cir. 2008) (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 
(2000)). 
173 SIFMA, supra note 17, at 2. 
174 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(1). 
175 Libowsky & Strashun, supra note 102. 
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The holdings in Edward D. Jones and Brown support the 
proposition that incidental recordkeeping burdens arising from 
state regulations and enforcement actions targeting BD conduct 
may be tolerated.  However, in Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co.,176 
the Minnesota Supreme Court found that claims against a BD 
brought under Minnesota’s common law of agency and Minne-
sota’s consumer protection statutes were impliedly preempted by 
federal law because they conflicted with Congress’s and the SEC’s 
understanding of efficient capital formation.177  Consequently, if 
these “incidental effects” of policing misconduct are too burden-
some for the industry, they can hinder the purpose of the statute 
and lead to conflict preemption.  
IV.  NSMIA DOES NOT PREEMPT STATE FIDUCIARY RULES 
THAT ARE REASONABLY CONSISTENT WITH THE FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES IMPOSED BY JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 
In light of NSMIA’s dual purpose, disposition of the current 
legal controversy hinges on whether the burdens to market 
efficiency outweigh the benefits of added protections to in-
vestors.178  As the SEC has noted when it promulgated Reg BI, 
preemption of state fiduciary regulations must be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis.179  The imposition of statutory fiduciary duties 
on BDs does not necessarily create excessive compliance require-
ments, because courts already find BDs are fiduciaries under 
certain circumstances.  The impact on the industry depends on the 
scope of the duties imposed by the fiduciary rule in question. 
State-specific rules that impose IA fiduciary duties on BDs 
can create substantial compliance costs for BDs, especially for 
those operating on a national level.  Unlike smaller, state-based 
firms, nationwide firms bear the costs of implementing the fiduci-
ary standards on a national scale, and when some states adopt 
higher fiduciary standards, the highest state standard becomes 
the rule across the board.180  The more state statutory standards 
depart from the federal requirements, the more implementation 
costs burden BDs’ nationwide operations, potentially leading to 
less affordable options for consumers seeking advice.  However, 
state statutes that shadow common law fiduciary standards, as 
 
176 545 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1996). 
177 Id. at 925.  
178 See supra Section II.A.  
179 See supra text accompanying note 107. 
180 Crawley, supra note 58, at 427–28. 
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applied to BDs, would not result in excessive compliance costs.  
First, case law precedent has been sensitive to the nature of the 
BD business model.  Second, both state and nationwide firms were 
already subject to those standards.  Third, reference to established 
common law principles would lead to consistency among state-
specific statutes, which would reduce the burdens of regulatory 
balkanization.  Last, even in states that adopt the strictest BD 
fiduciary standards imposed by the common law,181 empirical 
studies show that the relatively stricter fiduciary standard of care 
does not impact BDs’ ability to provide a broad range of products 
and services to consumers.182  
States can further moderate the adverse impact on the in-
dustry by effectively tailoring the scope of the fiduciary duty and 
by clearly defining its triggers.  For instance, one of the main 
problems facing BDs under some of the proposed rules is that 
standalone investment recommendations could trigger IA duties 
that include continuous account monitoring.  Ongoing account 
monitoring conflicts with the BD “transactional” model and could 
carry significant compliance costs.  State fiduciary rules can elimi-
nate these burdens by limiting the application of the fiduciary 
duties to the duration of the transaction. 
For example, the rule adopted by Massachusetts acknowl-
edges that BDs often satisfy demands for one-time recom-
mendations that do not rise to the level of continued strategic 
advice.183  Consequently, the fiduciary duty imposed by the rule is 
limited to the period where the incidental advice is made, and the 
advice is only deemed “ongoing” when: (1) the account is discre-
tionary; (2) there is “a contractual fiduciary duty”; or (3) there is 
“a contractual obligation to monitor.”184  New Jersey’s proposed 
rule contains similar terms, and also imposes an ongoing duty if 
the BD is acting as an adviser or is dually registered as an IA.185  
 
181 See supra Section I.B.2.  
182 Michael Finke & Thomas P. Langdon, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer Fidu-
ciary Standard on Financial Advice, J. FIN. PLANNING, July 2012, at 28, 36, https:// 
www.financialplanningassociation.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/JUL12%20JFP%20 
Finke.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ7Z-5K35]. 
183 Mass. Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 3–4.  
184 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(1)(b) (2020). 
185 Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, Investment Advisers, and Agents, 51 N.J. 
Reg. 493(a) (proposed April 15, 2019) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:47A-
6.4(a)); see also Kevin Smedley, Note, New Jersey’s Rule Proposal for Applying a Uni-
form Fiduciary Standard to Broker-Dealers: Why State Fiduciary Action Is Required 
To Protect Investors, 15 RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 304, 323–27 (2020) (addressing New 
Jersey’s proposed rule). 
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Both rules impose an ongoing duty to monitor in special circum-
stances, which is consistent with the precedent established by the 
courts in Capital Gains186 and in Leib.187 
Massachusetts incorporated breach of fiduciary duties to the 
list of BD “conduct [and] practices” deemed “unethical or dis-
honest” by the state’s securities laws.188  Its rule imposes clearly 
defined duties of “utmost care and loyalty” on BDs and their 
agents who provide investment advice or recommend investment 
strategies, account transfers, or security exchanges.189  The duty of 
care as outlined by both Massachusetts and New Jersey requires 
that BDs make a “reasonable inquiry” into the “risks, costs, and 
conflicts” related to the investment advice they give and consider 
the client’s particular circumstances, taking into account “any 
other relevant information.”190  The duty of loyalty requires that 
BDs make recommendations “without regard to the financial or 
any other interest of any party other than the customer.”191  This 
standard goes further than Reg BI, because it requires more than 
putting a client’s interest first: it requires BD agents to put aside 
their personal interests completely when making a recommen-
dation.  However, the enhanced fiduciary standard in both rules is 
in line with traditional agency law, and it is plainly consistent with 
the standard Dodd-Frank contemplated for BDs who give invest-
ment advice to retail investors: a standard “no less stringent than 
the standard applicable to” IAs under the Advisers Act, requiring 
action “without regard to the financial . . . interest of the 
broker.”192 
The Massachusetts rule engages in a balancing act.  Unlike 
the New Jersey proposal, the Massachusetts duty of loyalty re-
quires BDs to disclose “all material conflicts of interest,” but it 
 
186 See supra text accompanying notes 49–52. 
187 See supra text accompanying notes 79–82. 
188 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(1).  
189 Id. 12.207(1)(a), (2). 
190 Id. 12.207(2)(a); Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, Investment Advisers, and 
Agents, 51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:47A-6.4(b)(1)). 
191 See 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(2)(b); Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, 
Investment Advisers, and Agents, 51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE § 13:47A-6.4(b)(2)). 
192 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1828–29 (2010) (codified in relevant part at 15 U.S.C § 80b-
11(g)). 
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does not impose specific disclosure requirements.193  It also re-
quires BDs to “[m]ake all reasonably practicable efforts” to avoid, 
eliminate, or mitigate conflicts of interest, but it allows them to 
mitigate those conflicts that are intrinsic to the BD model and 
cannot be reasonably avoided.194  The rule only establishes a pre-
sumption of breach when BD agents make recommendations in 
connection to sales contests.195  Massachusetts’ rule further protects 
investors by stating that mere disclosure of conflicts does not 
satisfy the duty of loyalty.196  However, in line with established 
common law principles of agency, the rule excludes sophisticated 
parties such as banks, IAs, and institutional investors from its 
scope of operation.197  In sum, Massachusetts (1) imposes IA duties 
on BDs when “special circumstances” are present, and (2) shapes 
the scope of the duties to preserve the existing BD model.198  For 
these reasons, NSMIA should not preempt Massachusetts’s rule.  
Nevada’s proposed rule, on the other hand, is problematic.  
First, its BD duties are ongoing by default, and BDs must comply 
with detailed requirements to avail themselves of an “Episodic 
Fiduciary Duty Exemption.”199  Second, the rule establishes a pre-
sumption that BDs owe a broad fiduciary duty to their clients, and 
then proceeds to enumerate some exceptions—the opposite of the 
common law majority rule.200  Third, some portions of the rule are 
too broad and result in vagueness, unnecessarily increasing BD 
 
193 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(2)(b)(1); cf. Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, 
Investment Advisers, and Agents, 51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE § 13:47A-6.4(b)(2)). 
194 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(2)(b)(2). For example, receiving compensation 
for a recommendation would technically be a conflict. Mass. Adopting Release, supra 
note 15, at 5–6. However, BDs cannot reasonably avoid it within their current busi-
ness model, so the rule only requires BDs to mitigate it. Id. Similarly, New Jersey 
would allow BDs who meet the duty of care to receive transaction-based remuneration 
and commissions that are “reasonable and [are] the best of the reasonably available 
fee options.” Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, Investment Advisers, and Agents, 51 
N.J. Reg. 493(a) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:47A-6.4(b)(3)). 
195 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(2)(d); cf. Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, In-
vestment Advisers, and Agents, 51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE § 13:47A-6.4(b)(2)(i)). 
196 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(2)(c); cf. Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, In-
vestment Advisers, and Agents, 51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE § 13:47A-6.4(b)(2)(ii)). 
197 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(3); cf. Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, In-
vestment Advisers, and Agents, 51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE § 13:47A-6.4(c)). 
198 PIABA, Where We Stand, 26 PIABA B.J. 361, 391 (2019).  
199 Notice of Draft Regulations and Request for Comment, supra note 15, § 2. 
200 Id. § 9. 
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liability exposure and related compliance costs.201  Last, unlike the 
Massachusetts rule, the Nevada rule requires compliance with 
extensive specific disclosures in addition to those required by Reg 
BI.202  Because these disclosure requirements add actuarial and 
recordkeeping burdens without adding protections to investors, 
they are likely preempted. 
State regulators can also minimize implied compliance costs 
by expressly stating that any books and records requirements aris-
ing from the new fiduciary statutes are deemed satisfied through 
compliance with the federal requirements in 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i).203  
State regulators could similarly avoid conflict preemption risks 
arising from the written requirements of FINRA supervisory rule 
3110204 by expressly stating that the rule does not establish any 
written supervision procedures that differ from, or are in addition 
to, those required under federal securities laws and regulations, 
and applicable FINRA rules.  
To conclude, by effectively tailoring their statutes’ language 
and operation, states can boost investor protection beyond the fed-
eral law baseline without risking conflict preemption.  
V.  STATE FIDUCIARY RULES FURTHER PUBLIC TRUST IN THE 
MARKETS, WHICH IS KEY TO A HEALTHY ECONOMY 
AND GOOD PUBLIC POLICY 
When state rules carefully balance the competing interests 
embraced by NSMIA, the added protections to investors outweigh 
the incidental burdens of duplicative regulation.  Moreover, such 
state rules can add efficiency to the capital markets in several 
ways.  
To an individual investor, the cost of conflicted advice on returns 
is one percentage point each year.205  To the United States, these 
 
201 See, e.g., id. §§ 2, 5. 
202 Id. § 7. For example, the rule requires disclosure of actual gains. Id. These are 
hard to determine at the time of the transaction and would often require disclosures 
after conclusion of the transaction. 
203 See, e.g., 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(5) (2002) (“Nothing in [this section] 
shall be construed to establish any requirements for capital, custody, margin, finan-
cial responsibility, making and keeping of records, bonding, or financial or operational 
reporting for any broker-dealer or agent that differ from, or are in addition to, the 
requirements established under 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i).”); Fiduciary Duty of Broker-
Dealers, Investment Advisers, and Agents, 51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (proposed April 15, 
2019) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:47A-6.4(e)) (same). 
204 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
205 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS (“CEA”), THE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT 
ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS 25 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
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aggregate costs can add up to $17 billion per year.206  A recent 
study of the annuities markets suggests that contracts sold by BDs 
with fiduciary duties are about five percent more valuable than 
contracts sold by BDs without fiduciary duties.207  A modest an-
nual increase of $1,000 in savings per investor could save the 
country “$33 billion on public assistance programs between 2018 
and 2032.”208  That is efficient. 
If states enforce higher fiduciary standards on BDs providing 
investment advice, industry participants will likely find cost-
effective ways to comply.  BDs have strong incentives to continue 
providing services in the states where they operate.  In Massachu-
setts, for example, “hundreds of thousands” of consumers who hold 
BD accounts seek “episodic brokerage advice.”209  The need for fi-
nancial advice will continue to rise with the wave of retiring Baby 
Boomers.210  BDs are unlikely to walk away from these profitable 
markets, especially where state fiduciary rules allow them to 
preserve their transaction-based model. 
Reliable investment advice is key to healthy capital markets.211  
Retail investor interactions with financial advisors are seldom at 
arm’s length.  The law has traditionally imposed a fiduciary duty 
on the dominant party to reduce agency cost risks to the client and 
encourage participation: individual investors who do not trust 
their financial advisors are less likely to participate in the capital 
markets.212  Studies show that in complex societies the level of eco-
nomic prosperity is directly related to the level of trusting rela-
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tionships between its members.213  As much as investors value 
cheaper, transaction-based advice, conflicted advice comes with 
hidden costs.  From a business perspective, trust is also key to 
attracting millennial investors, who have a deep sense of distrust 
in the financial services industry and largely chose do-it-yourself 
(“DIY”) investment platforms.214  State fiduciary rules that har-
ness the wisdom of common law agency principles encourage and 
reward trust in the financial system, which in turn contributes to 
market efficiency and capital formation.215 
Even when they largely mirror protections afforded to inves-
tors by the common law, state fiduciary rules bring added value.  
First, they inject predictability into the system.  Judicial precedent 
applying fiduciary duties to BDs does not define BD duties with 
precision and is “widely inconsistent.”216  Many cases are solved 
through arbitration, which leads to a paucity of well-reasoned 
decisions and contributes to arbitrary fact finding and unpredict-
able outcomes.217  State fiduciary rules signal to investors that 
their financial interests will be protected in consistent ways, and 
give BDs concrete guidance on how to effectively avoid liability.  
Second, state fiduciary rules incentivize a shift in BD culture.  
They reflect investors’ expectation that a BD representative 
recommending an investment is not just a salesperson, but 
someone who holds a position of high responsibility and integrity.  
Moreover, they incentivize the industry to develop low-cost, 
quality advice alternatives to the traditional models, which BDs 
will need to thrive in a skeptical consumer market that is quickly 
shifting to cheap e-platforms and robo advisers.218 
The economic efficiency achieved by NSMIA’s strategic alloca-
tion of duties between the federal government and the states is 
enhanced when states invest more in antifraud enforcement, and 
all state efforts to deter unethical conduct should be encouraged.219  
The broad purposes of securities laws are served when the federal 
 
213 Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting: Comparing Benefits, Cost and 
Risk 13 (Bos. U. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 99-12, 1999), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
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and state governments coordinate their efforts to foster corporate 
responsibility, transparency, and integrity. 
State rules that incorporate the protections traditionally rec-
ognized by the common law are better suited than a uniform 
federal rule to achieve these goals.  Policing misconduct and pro-
tecting the public interest are within states’ historical powers.  
State autonomy fosters experimentation and more efficient regula-
tions.  A state is in a better position than the federal government 
to assess the behavior of its citizens as securities consumers, to 
detect new deceptive and unethical schemes, and to devise reg-
ulations tailored to the specific issues faced by investors in the 
state.220 
Federal regulators are hesitant to take actions with unpredict-
able systemic effects on the market, and state innovation reduces 
systemic risks while providing concrete data that Congress can 
consider in future legislative initiatives.  
CONCLUSION 
State fiduciary rules are not necessarily preempted by NSMIA 
because they fall within the area reserved to the states by 
NSMIA’s antifraud savings clause.  State common law precedents 
imposing fiduciary duties on BDs are not preempted, and allowing 
states to enforce their common law fiduciary standards while 
preempting their codification of those standards would be absurd.  
Congress has acquiesced to state enactment of broad unethical 
conduct rules, and state fiduciary rules are a logical outgrowth of 
this practice.  State fiduciary rules aimed at BD conduct are not 
expressly preempted, even if they imply incidental book- and 
recordkeeping burdens.  However, states should avoid imposing 
fiduciary schemes that excessively burden BD operations.  Fidu-
ciary rules that (1) impose ongoing monitoring requirements only 
when justified by the nature of the broker-client relationship, and 
(2) preserve the traditional BD commission-based fee structure 
are likely not preempted.  Last, allowing states to apply height-
ened fiduciary standards to the BDs who shape their citizens’ 
financial future is sound public policy: it preserves efficient 
markets and the right of investors to rely on the kind of advice that 
will make their choices informed, and free. 
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